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HAWAIIAN RECIPROCITY TREATY.

SPEECH

OF


HON. JUSTIN S. MORRILL,
OF VERMONT,

IN THE


UNITED STATES SENATE,

EXECUTIVE SESSION

MARCH 18, 1875.



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SPEECH
OF
HON. JUSTIN S. MORRILL.

The Senate (in executive session) having under consideration the treaty of commercial reciprocity between the United States and His Hawaiian Majesty—

Mr. MORRILL, of Vermont, said :

Mr. PRESIDENT : I have no prepared speech to make on the present occasion and the only advantage I shall have over those who have spoken in favor of the treaty will be, as I think, that I shall not be on the wrong side. The people of the State which I have the honor in part to represent have no local interest in the proposed reciprocity treaty with the King of the Sandwich Islands, and my conclusions upon its merits will be, therefore, wholly based upon national considerations. Let me say at the start to those who were firmly fixed in their opposition to Canadian reciprocity, that however insuperable might be the arguments against it, the arguments in its favor were tenfold stronger than any which can be brought to the support of reciprocity with the Sandwich Islands, and the precedent to be established is not less dangerous in the one case than the other. What may be done with King Kalakaua may be done with the Queen of Great Britain or the Autocrat of Russia.

For twenty years, or ever since 1855, the proposition for a reciprocity treaty with the Sandwich Islands has been kept before us and persistently urged, first by Mr. Harris, then by Mr. McCook, and recently by Mr. Allen, a gentleman of culture and character, who was first sent out there as our consul, came back as their minister, and now, I believe, holds the place of chief justice under King Kalakaua. He has been most assiduous in visiting and button-holing Senators here and at their homes, as many Senators have informed me. Doubtless he thinks he is right in asking for the surrender of what will be but little for us and much for those to whom he now owes allegiance. The most potent argument now offered is the same suggestion that has heretofore been most prominently presented, as in 1855 and 1869, namely, that if we do not make this arrangement—so feeble are their numbers, so lamentably deficient are their resources—they will be compelled to lean upon some other power. Great Britain or New Zealand will snatch them up and they will be lost to us for—

NOTE.—The Senate having passed a resolution authorizing the publication of all the speeches delivered on the Hawaiian treaty, it seems not inappropriate that something should appear from some one of those who argued against the treaty as well as from those who made carefully prepared speeches in its support. This is the substance of an extemporaneous speech, occupying when made about an hour and a half of time, and is as faithfully reproduced, after the lapse of some weeks, as it is possible by the author.

ever. Allow me to say if we are to come forward to the support of the paupers of the world—to bolster up all the islands, peninsulas, and continents whose waning finances need a tonic, or whose tottering dynasties are shivering in the wind—we shall have no lack of this sort of national missionary work.

But who or what is it that figures on one side of this compact, dignified by the name of a reciprocity treaty? Why, sir, a veritable kingdom of Lilliput, the whole trade of which does not amount to a tithe of that of the city of Memphis, Tennessee, or of the city of Portland, Maine, each having about 40,000 inhabitants. The population of the Sandwich Islands in 1860 is stated to have been 120,000, but our intercourse with them, philanthropic and enterprising as it has been, seems to have sadly diminished their numbers, so that now their census shows only 56,897 inhabitants, of which 5,366 are foreigners and 2,487 half-castes. It is obvious that these people, living in a climate which exacts little labor for a bare subsistence from those without ambition for anything more, will never furnish a market for any considerable amount of manufactures or products of any kind. Their means and their wants are equally narrow and are at the lowest point of semi-civilization. But poor and dwindling as they are, it is expected that a closer commercial contact and a free reciprocal intercourse will soon extinguish throne and dynasty, as well as the last fleeting breath of their national existence. Once the natives of this waif in the ocean would have Cooked and eaten us up in a different way, but this is a reversal of the feast to which we are invited, and now our power of digestion is to be tested.

It has been claimed in the opening speech made here that the proposition before us is one in the *usual form of reciprocity treaties*. Pray what is meant by the term of "usual form of reciprocity treaties?" There is no such form. We have no such treaties, and never have had but one, and that one of so unsavory a sort that it was abrogated at the earliest possible moment. We have had several reciprocity abortions—notably two with these same islands, or the proposed treaty of 1855 and that of 1869, both of which were rejected, although urged with the same persuasive arguments used to-day, including the never-forgotten one, that, if we do not do this, somebody else will right away. Besides these abortions we have had also the proposed Zollverein treaty of 1844, and the proposed Canadian treaty of last year, each in its turn having been coldly and very properly rejected. If it was intended to say that the present proposition is in the form of the Canadian reciprocity treaty of 1854, then I deny it. That treaty provided for the full and complete assent, by the passage of the laws required, of all the legislative departments of the respective governments before it was to take effect. This Hawaiian treaty, however, by its terms is to go into operation "as soon as it shall have been approved and proclaimed by His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands and shall have been ratified and duly proclaimed on the part of the Government of the United States, and the laws required to carry it into operation shall have been passed by the Congress of the United States of America."

It will be observed that the treaty is to take effect when proclaimed by His Majesty the King and by the Government of the United States—meaning the President of course—and the after-thought, tacked on at the end, about the laws required to carry it into operation is of little binding force if the arguments of some Senators are to be accepted as correct, that such a treaty as this, when advised and consented to by the Senate, will be the supreme law of

the land, either by executing itself or by making it the duty of the House of Representatives or of Congress to consent to the passage of all laws required to carry it into operation. When Canadian reciprocity was before us, the form presented was very different and required the assent and action of Congress first and before ratification, but here, whether by accident or design, ratification stands foremost. Should Congress refuse or omit to pass any laws upon the subject, according to the extreme doctrines of some Senators here, none would be necessary and the treaty might still be proclaimed as the supreme law of the land without the co-operation of the House of Representatives. The Treasury Department would be able at once to order the sugar and rice and other articles received from Hawaii to be admitted free of duty, according to the treaty, and then might snap its fingers at Congress. In any event this part of the treaty should be amended,* for I will not assume that it is really intended to evade the future action of Congress as to the passage of the laws required.

I hope it will not be considered presumption in me once more to call the attention of the Senate briefly to what I hold to be the unconstitutional character of reciprocity treaties. The Senate itself has after elaborate reports twice decided against them, and has so repeatedly rejected them as to make them suspected and more than questionable as a class. Four have been squarely rejected and only one accepted. When the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1844 made, through Mr. Choate, their well-considered report on the Zollverein treaty, the unconstitutionality of reciprocity treaties was so clearly demonstrated that the treaty was at once laid on the table as the most inoffensive way of getting rid of it. President Tyler, not being satisfied with this action, again urged further consideration of the measure at the next session, and then (1845) a final report by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Archer, of Virginia, was made, reaffirming the positions of the former report and re-enforcing them by additional arguments. There are few men whose indorsement would add much weight to the senatorial opinions of Mr. Choate, but his authority gives to me what I need, a very solid support. Mr. Archer, by virtue of his long service in the House of Representatives, was made chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate upon his first entrance here, and so continued to the end of his service. In the history of our country no man has had for a longer period a more controlling voice in the conduct of our foreign affairs than Mr. Archer. He claimed that the Zollverein treaty would have promoted our interests, and yet he rejected it on the higher constitutional grounds. If Mr. Archer and Mr. Choate, twice backed by a large majority of the Senate, found no warrant in the Constitution for such treaties, I hope to be excused for sharing their blindness.

Such a treaty as a reciprocity treaty was unknown at the time the Constitution was framed, and to-day there is not one existing in the world—between any nations here or elsewhere. It is wholly a new and modern invention. It may be claimed that the Cobden treaty between France and Great Britain was of this character, but such is not the fact. That treaty was for the reduction of duties and the removal of those of a prohibitory character. Its operation was not entirely satisfactory, having destroyed several flourishing branches of British trade, besides proving so detrimental to the revenues of France that President Thiers, at the close of the recent war with Germany, was compelled to ask for its abrogation.

*This was subsequently amended.

The Constitution of the United States gives to Congress the whole power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. There is no residuum of power left to be exercised elsewhere. It is as exclusively belonging to Congress as any other of the provisions in the whole chapter, or as the power "to provide and maintain a navy," or "to establish post-offices and post-roads," or "to raise and support armies." What would be said of a treaty which should be made providing for a reciprocity in establishing post-roads—we to build one and Canada another? What of a treaty providing for doubling the number of our naval vessels or for reducing them one-half? What of a treaty that should reciprocally require a larger or a smaller standing army? And yet the treaty-making power is no more excluded from doing these things than from regulating commerce by making dutiable articles free to the subjects of the King of Hawaii. If any one of the distinct powers of Congress can be invaded, all may be. A reciprocity treaty is an instrument that may be made to do all sorts of work. It has the genius of adaptability for the big job of yesterday and for this little one of to-day.

Let me strip the husk off from these so-called reciprocity treaties, and that husk it will be seen is all in the word reciprocity. Look at the present treaty and from beginning to end there is nothing in it but a compact to regulate commerce with His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, from whence rice, sugar, and other articles are to be exempt, by the treaty, from the payment of all duties, while any other rice and sugar are not exempt. Congress regulates commerce only by the passage of general laws applicable to all the world alike, but here, under the guise of reciprocity, the treaty-making power undertakes to regulate commerce by a special bargain which grants favors to one kingdom that are denied everywhere else. How far and how long the Senate will advise the Executive to travel in this direction time will disclose, but to whatever extent it may go it will to that extent be a suspension of the legislative power of the nation.

Possibly it will be contended that all of our treaties more or less attempt to regulate commerce, but it will be found that not one of them attempts to make any compact as to the rates of duties to be imposed or not to be imposed upon the importations of produce or merchandise, the only object of commerce, and the point where alone it can be regulated. There is a difference in the comity and usage of nations as to the treatment of foreign vessels when visiting their ports, with freights or passengers, laden or unladen, for repairs or for stores, and our treaties very properly embrace such questions as salvage, pilotage, quarantine, consular duties and privileges, light-house and harbor dues, but these are mere incidents of our general intercourse with the world, and do not even pretend to touch the primary question of regulating commerce.

The Constitution explicitly declares that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives." One of the largest sources of revenue undoubtedly is the duty fixed by Congress on sugars, and this source of revenue the treaty is to step in and dry up so far as sugars from the Sandwich Islands are concerned. Of what value to the House of Representatives will be the power to originate revenue bills, if the treaty-making power should step by step leave nothing upon which such bills can operate? Will it be said that a treaty is not a "bill" and therefore is not inhibited? That would be merely a petty subterfuge. This is one of the popular privileges of the people—to tax or not to tax, when and how they please—

confided to the sole guardianship of the House, and the House as long as it maintains its own self-respect must stand as a sentinel to resist attempts to exclude them from their full participation in the joint power of regulating commerce and especially to resist any diminution of their exclusive power to initiate all revenue measures—never intended to be initiated otherwise than by bills. The Constitution speaks in the imperative mood: *they shall originate in the House of Representatives.*

If reciprocity treaties are to become the settled policy of the country, then farewell to all stability in our revenue laws. The Executive will agitate these questions as well as Congress. We shall be subject to all the changes which foreign powers may successfully urge upon whoever may happen to be an able and influential Secretary of State. Our own interests will have to be bartered for the interests of foreigners, and reciprocal compromises will be the order of the day. There must be a pretense of equal sacrifices in order to give some meaning to the word reciprocity. In the present case we are to give up ten, if not twenty, times the revenue given up by King Kalakaua, and yet that is called "reciprocity!" It is obvious, if this policy shall be established, that any party when coming into power would find its first duty in a revision of reciprocity treaties. Free trade or protection could be established for twenty as well as for seven years, the limit of the present treaty, and long after any Administration responsible for such a treaty had been, it may be, driven from power by the verdict of the people.

These are no idle suggestions. Precedents for the exercise of power once established are seldom eradicated. Executive, legislative, and judicial bodies are prone to amplify and extend their jurisdiction and rarely practice self-abnegation by any restricted construction of their constitutional functions. I am sure that I do not desire to cripple the just power of the Senate, nor to diminish that affectionate respect so generally accorded and to which it has been so long historically entitled. But I trust I may be pardoned for avowing my deliberate convictions that reciprocity treaties are unconstitutional, and that they must be practically regarded as a serious invasion of the rights of the House of Representatives, and whether constitutional or not they will subject the Senate to popular criticism and jealousy that had much better be avoided. The exercise of legitimate power often excites detraction, but the exercise of doubtful power always excites execration.

I know that some of these objections are sought to be obviated by the proposition which looks to obtaining the assent of the House of Representatives. But the House, however, has no power to give its assent any more than it could delegate to the Executive the right to coin money or to declare war. The House of to-day cannot consent to waive its own right, much less to waive the right of the House of to-morrow. In spite of all treaties its functions and privileges must remain the same. No provision of the Constitution can be put out of sight and held in abeyance even for seven years by the forms of a treaty with His Majesty King Kalakaua, or any other foreign potentate.

Reciprocity treaties fly directly in the face of the "most favored nation clause," which exists in nearly all of our treaties with every nation in the world and bind us to admit the products and manufactures of one country on the same terms conceded to the products and manufactures of any other country. We have at least thirty-five of these treaties confronting us as an absolute bar to any special favors which shall not at once become common to all, or a bar to any

treaty of reciprocity whatsoever. We have agreed over and over again not to do it, and the agreements being mutual were and are as much for our benefit as for that of others, being designed to prevent all discrimination either by ourselves or others, while reciprocity treaties have no other design than to establish discrimination. They are hostile and adverse to all other nations except the parties to the compact, and must be regarded as unfriendly by all whom its terms practically exclude.

It is true that I have sometimes pondered the question as to the propriety of making some discrimination in favor of republics, perhaps in favor of the South American governments, and certainly, if we were to have reciprocity anywhere, it would seem to be the part of broader statesmanship to make such compacts with Mexico, Buenos Ayres, the Argentine Republic, or Brazil—countries of sufficient population and wealth to give us some prospect of a larger market for our own products—rather than with the Hawaiian kingdom where our ambition must be satisfied with a prospect at zero or with a most pitiful and beggarly extension of commerce.

But, sir, on the whole, our ancient policy, handed down from the fathers, of holding all mankind "enemies in war; in peace, friends," is by far the wisest and safest national policy. Discrimination, by extending favors in one direction and withholding them from another, must in the end breed discord and arouse jealousies that will not tend to promote the interests of universal peace. Favoritism is ever odious. Should the policy of reciprocity treaties prevail to any extent it would create hateful "rings" among nations, quite as odious as any holy alliance of a by-gone age, and become the fruitful source of unnumbered fretful complications. Having promulgated the great American doctrine of the equality of mankind, let us not be the foremost to set the un-American example of granting special privileges to favored nations.

The Sandwich Islands include a small group, nearly midway in the Pacific Ocean, more than two thousand miles away from San Francisco, and about three thousand from China. But, although the most valuable, they are by no means the only islands of the Pacific, which is dotted all over with petty islands, forming a vast but very inconsequential archipelago. Among these are the Bonin, the Ladrone, the Marshall, the Mulgrave, and others, scattered far and wide, altogether too numerous to mention. Some geologists have supposed that in an earlier age there was a broad continent in the Pacific which has gradually sunk out of sight, leaving as islands only the higher elevations, and this sinking process, it has been affirmed, is still going on at Honolulu, but it is hardly probable that the islands will be submerged before the time named for the expiration of the proposed treaty, although this may be as much to be dreaded as the danger of which we have been forewarned, from their being gobbled up by the New Zealanders.

The financial question raised by this treaty, in proportion to its magnitude, will be a tough and unprofitable one for the Treasury of the United States. Measured by the past, it will deprive us of \$500,000 of revenue. Measured by the whole amount of sugars annually produced in the Sandwich Islands, and this must be the actual test, it would at once be nearly double this amount, to be further augmented year by year until the utmost sugar-producing capacity of the islands shall have been reached. This capacity is variously estimated and will reach from three to five times the amount of the present production, which is stated to be from twenty-three to thirty million

pounds. So that from one hundred to one hundred and fifty million pounds of Sandwich Island sugars may ultimately take the place of an equal amount coming from other places that is now subject to the payment of duties, averaging, for the class which will be received, not less than $3\frac{1}{2}$ cents per pound, and may soon involve an uncompensated loss to the Treasury of two, three, or four million dollars annually.

The charming reciprocity for our loss is that His Majesty King Kalakaua will surrender about forty or fifty thousand dollars of revenue, as hard for him to bear very probably as our much larger surrender; but if the owners of the sugar plantations, after having over 60 per cent. added to the value of their product, do not replace twice or thrice the amount of the king's loss of revenue, their sense of gratitude must be obtuse, and they will deserve the treatment they might have received from the hands of the king's hungry ancestors.

The duty we have charged upon sugars has been, when under No. 7 Dutch standard, $1\frac{1}{2}$ cent per pound; over that and not over No. 10, 2 cents per pound; over that and not over No. 13, $2\frac{1}{2}$ cents per pound; over that and not over No. 16, $2\frac{3}{4}$ cents per pound; over that and not over No. 20, $3\frac{1}{2}$ cents per pound. By our recent legislation we have added 25 per cent. to all of these rates. Sugars of No. 13 Dutch standard are very passable common grocery sugars. The great bulk of the sugars from the Sandwich Islands will be brought up to or over No. 16 Dutch standard, and will compete with other sugars which would be charged with a fraction over $3\frac{1}{2}$ cents per pound duty. They will make the most profit on the highest grades, and of course will prepare and send these exclusively. The highest grades are as legitimately Sandwich Island sugars as the lowest grades.

Our market for their sugars is the best they can possibly have, treaty or no treaty, charged with duty or not. The duty is a sheer loss to us and a sheer gain to the twenty-five owners of the sugar plantations, whether they reside in Hawaii or elsewhere. It is an immense subsidy to these wholly private interests and far more obnoxious than any subsidy which has heretofore found congressional advocates. However honestly intended by the parties to the negotiation, I feel constrained to denounce it as a job, the chief result of which will be to put money into the purses of a few Hawaiian sugar planters, who have captured a good enough king to march at the head of their triumphant procession through the country at our expense and who by and by is to issue his royal proclamation ratifying the treaty.

When the rejected Hawaiian treaty of 1869 was before us it was claimed as a merit that all of the owners but two of the twenty-five were foreigners and almost wholly Americans. There is no doubt they are so now. They may be called smart, whether we are or not. We are proposing to pay for their ventures at least $3\frac{1}{2}$ cents upon every pound of sugar they may send to our market, which will nearly double their profits. No duty being imposed upon sugars imported there, whatever they require for their own consumption will hereafter be obtained from India and China, and it is quite possible their own crop will be miraculously re-enforced by these cheap oriental resources. If the sugar from the Indies takes another name, will it not be as sweet?

If we are to give such a bounty as this just at the time we have increased the duty 25 per cent. upon our own people to obtain more revenue, it seems to me that it would be far better to be-

stow it upon the home production of sugar rather than upon any foreign production. If we were to offer even one cent per pound bounty on home-made sugar, I cannot doubt but the increase of cane, beet, and maple sugars would soon far out-strip the whole product of the Sandwich Islands, and how much more it would contribute to the prosperity of our own people! California, not surfeited with the vast increase of Hawaiian sugars, produced most probably there by the employment of large numbers of Chinese laborers, would nobly strive with Louisiana for the mastery, and the gold to be sent abroad for sugars would be sensibly and profitably diminished. This was the policy of Napoleon in encouraging the culture of the sugar-beet, which at length, instead of requiring a bounty, was found to be so profitable as to be able to bear taxation when the cane sugars of French dependencies could not. The beet sugar of California now amounts to one million of pounds and is increasing. It deserves the tenderest encouragement instead of this neck-and-neck contest with the Hawaiian speculators. I would not unreservedly argue that a bounty on home-made sugars would be expedient, but I cannot hesitate to denounce the Sandwich Island bounty as wholly inexpedient.

The production of rice in our own Southern States and of the cane sugars of Louisiana and the Gulf States has been greatly depressed, and it is profoundly to be hoped that in spite of all obstacles they will, under the large protection offered by our present scale of duties, soon revive and pass any limits to which they have heretofore been confined. Surely our sugar-planters cannot look with any complacency upon the fact that they are to have the Sandwich Islands as equal competitors for a class of sugars similar to their own. In 1855 the objections of Louisiana Senators to a like treaty then proffered were thought to be very potential. Her interest in the question to-day is not less, but greater.

Will California and Oregon be benefited by this treaty? If they were to be, that might be claimed at least as a local benefit. But they will not obtain their sugar at any reduction from the market price, whatever may be exempt from duties at their ports. If that were otherwise the provision of the Constitution, that duties shall be *uniform throughout the United States*, would be indirectly violated. The only effect will be that the owners of Hawaiian sugars will obtain an advance in price just equal to the duties released, and the more we import of these, the less shall we import of other dutiable sugars. Our people on the Pacific coast will not be benefited in the slightest degree as to the cost of living, although it is not improbable their sugar refineries may be destroyed. Their occupation to a large extent will be superseded, and this will be a considerable local loss that will not be compensated by an increase of other trade. The poverty of the Hawaiians, their inferior state of civilization, and their deeply rooted habits of indolence, give no promise of enterprise, nor of any considerable expansion of trade. The removal of their 10 per cent. duties heretofore charged on some of our products will not be so great an advantage as to enable us to control their markets against all the world, and, if we could monopolize their whole trade, it would be a very small nugget in the commerce of the Pacific coast, or the merest trifle and wholly incapable of diverting attention from the vast field which lies beyond.

There was a time when Honolulu was of greater importance as a rendezvous of our whale fishermen than it is to-day. But the whale, that gigantic game of the ocean, seems to be disappearing. The

hunchback, the sperm, and the right whale are no longer plentiful anywhere. The Greenland fisheries were thought to have been exhausted some years ago, although they have been so relentlessly pursued elsewhere that they have made their reappearance there, but in lessened numbers. The number of our whalers in the Pacific has been reduced from over two hundred and fifty to less than one hundred, and the catch, from an average of often one thousand barrels of oil for each vessel to less than six hundred. One-half of the whales taken near Alaska, or around the Aleutian islands, have also an unfortunate alacrity when struck by the harpoon of sinking beyond recovery and are lost.

The wonderful discovery of kerosene, or rock oil, has in a large measure superseded sperm oil. It no longer furnishes a cheap light. The vocation of whalemén no longer dazzles sea-going adventurers by its profits, and has ceased to be a world-wide necessity. Ocean-going steamers by their huge dimensions and rapid voyages absorb the freights of whole fleets of the smaller fry of sailing-vessels, and the bulk of the commerce of the Pacific Ocean, as elsewhere, will hereafter be carried by these steam leviathans of the great deep. The few whalemén we have left which may visit the Pacific will derive no advantages whatever by this treaty. Their interests are wholly untouched. They have always been allowed to deposit cordage and ship-stores there in bond and, upon returning to refit, to take what they wanted without payment of duties. Whatever flag covers the islands there will never be a government there so stupid as to deny such privileges to anybody. It is the chief link that connects them with the rest of mankind.

Once American statesmen might have felt disinclined to see these islands pass under the control of any other power, as it has been stated was the case with Daniel Webster. In that part of the message of President Tyler in 1842, supposed to have been written by Mr. Webster, it is true that he states such a condition of affairs "could not but create dissatisfaction," but he at the same time takes good care to say that the United States "seeks, nevertheless, no peculiar advantages; no exclusive control over the Hawaiian government, but is content with its independent existence and anxiously wishes for its prosperity and security." This was a position wholly at war with what we are now proposing to do. Webster sought no peculiar advantages then, and much less would he now, if he were living, with far less favoring circumstances, seek to give or take the peculiar advantages of a reciprocity treaty.

At the bottom of this scheme something more grave than this treaty it appears is impending. The superstructure of reciprocity might topple and fall if there was not something stronger at the base. The Hawaiian inhabitants are decreasing, it is declared, at the rate of 2 per cent. per annum. Soon they will be too few in numbers to support a monarchy or any other kind of national government. The government is a small drop in the ocean to be absorbed by the first larger drop with which it comes in contact. Their whole revenues from all sources are less, it is said, than two hundred thousand dollars. Already they are financially embarrassed, and must somehow borrow a million or two for immediate relief. They have no security to offer but their government and the islands. "Nor is the matter of much consequence," says Mr. Pierce, our minister resident, "inasmuch as the loan, if taken, can never be repaid." Whoever loans King Kalakaua a million or more, may exact the pound of flesh or the surrender of the islands whenever the loan shall become due,

and we are teaching the king to lean upon us for such a loan as his most distinguished acquaintance. The treaty, if consented to, will diminish his revenues on imports forty or fifty thousand dollars, and how then, as we shall have been the latest cause of so much of his woe, can we refuse the loan? This is the tropical fruit the treaty will be expected to ripen and which we are to stand in readiness to catch when it drops. We are urged to make a reciprocity treaty because other nations will be eager, if we fail to do it, to make a loan that "can never be repaid." The next step in this little drama will be for us to tender the loan so greatly needed because New Zealand has already offered it, and King Kalakaua does not seek absorption in that direction, but prefers the honor of being the debtor of the United States. He prefers to take refuge when swallowed in a larger stomach. The ultimate object thus comes to the surface. It is to prepare the way for an island colony in the Pacific Ocean, not contiguous, but two thousand miles away from our shores. Should that be our American policy?

To Great Britain colonies have long been a necessity. First, to afford a market for her manufactures by which their dense population derive their only means of support; second, to afford an outlet for large numbers of the unemployed and more or less turbulent class of their people; third, to give official employment to the younger sons and lower ranks of their aristocracy. Colonies have therefore been the safety-valves through which the dangerous surplus of their population makes its exit, and by which political explosions and revolutions have been postponed or avoided.

The United States are under no such necessities. (1.) Our ample territory will afford our people room and verge enough for centuries to come. Our new States and Territories are panting for every soul they can induce to leave the older States. We have no surplus or turbulent population anywhere that we want to be rid of. The strength of a nation in peace or war lies not in dispersion but in concentration. (2.) Our manufactures yet fall far below what are required for home consumption, and we therefore have a better market at home than any we can create by means of colonies abroad. (3.) Nor do we desire to multiply places for official employments, and thus swell our already extravagant national expenditures.

The colonial system even to Great Britain has been an oppressive financial burden and the source of many wars as well as of bloody revolts on the part of the subjugated nations or other disputants. In these collisions it mattered little on which side the slaughter occurred, as in any event the disappearance of useless friends or dangerous foes could be dwelt upon with composure. In New Zealand these collisions have been constant and exhaustive. To-day the Canadian Dominions, Australia, and New Zealand might proclaim independence without a blow or a protest against it from the mother country. The colonial system is in its dotage. The discovery of new worlds no longer feeds this vanity of nations. The world will not long tolerate colonial monopolies, and the day is coming when no part of enlightened mankind will consent to remain the political underlings of any foreign rulers.

There is no attribute in the character of our people, and no principle in our form of government, that can give success to any system of American colonies. Our ambition has been properly limited to the desire that all nations should be free and independent. We have been trained to govern ourselves, not others. With all of our well-founded historic hatred of colonial systems, shall we, when all of its

glories are becoming dim in the eyes of the world, start in the colonial business by an enterprise that will find its chief distinction not in its magnitude, but in its resplendent littleness? If we were to squat anywhere, or were disposed to add anything to the land-stealing fame of the Anglo-Saxon race, Cuba or Mexico might at least give some dignity and grandeur to a criminal blunder, but Hawaii is a mere speck that can only blot our record and make our eagerness for colonial appendages ridiculous.

There is one more notable argument, namely, that we need the Hawaiian Islands as a naval station, and this is as baseless as all the rest. It has been said that it is "due to the Pacific coast as a guard." Two thousand miles away from the Pacific coast, and yet to stand as a guard! This does not appear to me as a very substantial argument. The strong arms of the men of California and Oregon—and we have none worthier or stronger—are abundantly able to defend their own coasts. They need no other bulwarks to repel all assailants. Has Maine ever been afraid of Halifax or Quebec? Has she ever wanted any islands of the Atlantic to guard her coasts? No, sir! When in the progress of the negotiations for the settlement of our northwestern boundary Great Britain offered to give us Newfoundland for Oregon and Washington, the offer was at once refused. Distant islands must be defended and have no power to guard a continent.

To build up and maintain a naval station of any importance involves a large expenditure; and at the Sandwich Islands, if made entirely safe, it would be exceptionally large. All the harbors and coasts would have to bristle with forts, batteries, and martello towers. Wharfs, docks, and yards would have to be provided, and all the material for the purpose transported from our own shores. Men for garrison duty would have to be permanently stationed there, and naval vessels constantly sent and maintained to represent our flag. All this, however, would be of no consequence unless at the approach of peril we had at the instant more guns afloat there than our enemy. A stronger force than our own would capture the islands in half an hour, as we might do if they were in hostile hands and it was of any importance to us to possess them. In time of peace we can have all the privileges that are needful, as we have at Liverpool, Havana, or Bremen; and in time of war the islands would be a source of weakness by multiplying points of attack and by withdrawing from home the ships and men required for their defense. The rocks of Gibraltar, Malta,* and Saint Helena are truly formidable and are very capable of defense, but if Great Britain should at last find her strength waning at home in comparison with other powers, all these would furnish to her own shores no security against an attack waged by an equal enemy and conducted according to the methods of modern warfare. But the Sandwich Islands have no resemblance to Malta and Gibraltar, and could not themselves be made defensible much less capable of offense.

It will be seen that I am opposed to this treaty—

First. Because it seems to me to be in open and plain conflict with the provisions of the Constitution.

Second. Because it would establish a policy and a precedent of discrimination and favoritism in our intercourse with foreign nations—exposing us to the jealousies and ill-will of those less favored—and

* Each of these stations (Gibraltar and Malta) cost the British government annually over \$2,000,000 to maintain.

would be a broad departure from the true American policy of the fathers of the Republic.

Third. Because it offers financially little or no compensation to our Treasury or to our people for an extravagant subsidy, amounting to millions, bestowed upon a small number who own sugar-plantations in Hawaii.


Fourth. Because it is now, as it ever has been, a job of a few sugar-planters to enrich themselves at the expense of the United States.

Fifth. Because only on the most diminutive scale can it increase our commerce. The character of their population, small in numbers, destitute of property, little advanced in civilization, except in its vices, deplorably feeble in mechanic arts, education, science, and trade, forbids all ideas of an extensive or profitable commerce.

Sixth. Because we should not take any incipient steps toward the establishment of colonies which, if established, would be wholly incongruous and incompatible with the fundamental principles of our form of government.

Seventh. Because, if our full title to the islands were to be completed, we should have an elephant on our hands, costing large sums annually, of no practical use to ourselves in time of peace, and inspiring no dread among our foes in time of war.

Eighth. Because there is no general sentiment of the country in its favor, and because there is and ought to be a general sentiment in the House of Representatives against all so-called reciprocity treaties.



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